PUBLIC FINDINGS

The FAA ground stop and the SMART rollout

Zeffer Research • November 14, 2026 • Public-record edition

A nationwide ground stop followed a router incident during an FAA telecom switchover. Three days earlier, the FAA announced nationwide expansion of SMART, its AI-enabled traffic-planning tool. The public record supports the telecom explanation. It also leaves unresolved questions about the decision to expand SMART 50 days after regional launch, while Congress was asking about a 90-day evaluation.

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The findings document public evidence, attributed statements and unresolved questions. No misconduct is alleged. Reporting cutoff and final review are November 14, 2026, Pacific time.

TIMELINE

How the programs began

July 2002. FAA awarded Harris Corporation the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) contract. Harris is a predecessor to L3Harris. The original procurement was for a telecommunications backbone, decades before SMART. **[1]**

November 2020 through 2024. FAA sought industry input on Flow Management Data and Services (FMDS), its planned replacement for the Traffic Flow Management System. Later surveys and a May 2024 update demonstrate a multiyear acquisition effort. A market survey establishes that the agency solicited input. It gives no date for an ASI pitch or demonstration. **[2]**

2020–21. Renegade says it led ASI's first institutional round in 2020. Alaska Airlines announced a multiyear Flyways deal in May 2021, after a six-month trial. Dispatchers evaluated route suggestions before acting. **[3, 4]**

December 2023. ASI announced a $34 million Series B led by Andreessen Horowitz. It already had commercial airline experience. Verizon separately won the FENS successor network-services award in March 2023. **[3, 5]**

April 28, 2025. ASI executive Bernard Asare wrote the House transportation committee supporting modernization funding and offering to work with federal officials. It is a dated policy pitch. The first technical pitch to FAA, its attendees, evaluated capabilities and competing presentations remain undocumented in this review. **[6]**

July–December 2025. Congress funded broader modernization in Public Law 119-21. FAA selected Peraton as prime integrator December 4, identifying copper-to-fiber conversion as an early priority. **[7, 8]**

TIMELINE

Contract, launch and congressional letters

March 31, 2026. ASI PAC contributed $2,500 to Alfonso for Congress. Michael Alfonso is Duffy's son-in-law. The campaign receipt predates the announced award. **[25, 26]**

June 22–23. DOT and FAA announced ASI's selection June 22. USAspending lists June 23 and $875.95 million in potential value for the FMDS award. SMART sits within FMDS. The source-selection memorandum was not available for this review. **[9, 10]**

August 12. FAA awarded AT&T a $74.3 million FENS startup task order. AT&T took the successor program's lead role, with Verizon continuing core network work. **[44, 45]**

September 14. GAO identified cost and scheduling weaknesses in the wider modernization program. **[11]**

September 21. Limited SMART use began in the Washington area, serving Reagan National, Dulles and Baltimore/Washington International. Rep. Don Beyer called for suspension pending safeguards and workforce input. **[12, 13]**

September 28 and October 1. Sen. Eric Schmitt and Rep. Tracey Mann introduced the Senate and House Modern Skies bills, after the ASI award. The broader funding proposal included strategic traffic-flow technology. **[14]**

October 9 and 13. Sen. Chris Van Hollen and House lawmakers asked Duffy and Bedford for a pause and answers by October 19. On October 13, the Ocasio-Cortez office publicized the request. In a separate letter, Rick Larsen, André Carson and 21 other House Democrats asked GAO for an audit. **[15, 16]**

October 15–21. Politico and Semafor reported preliminary FAA equity discussions. ASI announced a $325 million Series C on October 20. Craft published its investment rationale and BGR's quarterly lobbying report became public. **[21–24, 27]**

TIMELINE

Fifty days to nationwide expansion

Day 0, September 21. Regional deployment. Lawmakers later said they understood the first phase to include a 90-day evaluation. **[12, 15]**

Day 18, October 9. Pause letter to Duffy and Bedford. It requests a pause in use pending answers and cites the understood evaluation period. The request and the evaluation are distinct. **[15]**

Day 22, October 13. GAO audit request to Acting Comptroller General Orice Brown. **[16]**

Day 28, October 19. Date the pause letter sought answers. A public response resolving its questions was not located. **[15]**

Day 50, Tuesday, November 10. FAA announced it would use SMART in the airspace of all 22 centers. This was 32 days after the pause letter and 40 days short of 90 elapsed days. The announcement described the regional rollout as successful, without stating who approved a schedule change or whether the evaluation continued after expansion. **[17]**

Day 53, Friday, November 13. Air-traffic communications and radar instability led to a national ground stop. The FAA later lifted it. Duffy described a legacy telecommunications overload and excluded SMART from the cause. **[18–20]**

Day 54, Saturday, November 14. Duffy tied the equipment behavior to a telecom switchover during L3Harris work. The contractor said it was assisting the FAA. **[18, 30]**

Who was alerted? The letters identify their recipients. The public releases establish public announcement dates. Congressional offices reported that some frontline workers had days of notice, or none, before the September launch. Internal notices, local go-live orders, delivery acknowledgments and the November distribution list remain to be obtained. **[12, 15–17]**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive summary

What happened. On November 13 the FAA stopped departures nationally after radar and communications became unstable. In a November 14 briefing, Duffy described a router switchover during L3Harris copper-to-fiber work. He reported more than 1,000 connection attempts every four to five seconds. He left open user error, installation error and defective hardware. Reuters reported that 17 of 22 en route centers were affected. **[18–20, 29, 30]**

Was SMART involved? Duffy said SMART was separate from the failed system. ASI publicly denied that SMART, any other ASI product or its FAA integration caused the stop. The sources reviewed do not establish SMART's operating state at onset or show its traffic traversing the affected router. The telecom explanation fits the strongest public evidence and awaits a final technical account. **[18, 19, 29, 32]**

Why was SMART expanded after 50 days? The official explanation was that the regional deployment succeeded. FAA published benefit figures. Its national-expansion announcement does not include the underlying timetable, signed safety gate or rollout approval explaining the 90-day evaluation lawmakers had described. Congress requested a pause pending answers. The record does not establish that Congress imposed a binding 90-day hold. **[12, 15–17]**

What do the financial records establish? FMDS and SMART share a contract with $875.95 million in potential value. Investors include a16z and Craft Ventures, whose founders have documented administration advisory roles. BGR, Duffy's former firm, disclosed lobbying for ASI, and ASI PAC contributed to Duffy's son-in-law's campaign. Each relationship warrants specific records questions. Together they establish no procurement intervention or technical role in the outage. **[9, 10, 21–28]**

First records to seek. An FAA incident report, signed SMART expansion approval and procurement selection memorandum.

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

The ground stop and recovery

The FAA issued a ground stop after multiple Air Route Traffic Control Centers reported communications problems. Duffy placed the onset at about 3:36 p.m. Eastern. FAA Advisory 111 lists its event start at 20:53 UTC and its effective time and signature at 20:54 UTC, equivalent to 3:53 and 3:54 p.m. Eastern. Duffy said the airspace reopened at 8:15 p.m. Eastern. Those times distinguish reported onset, the formal advisory and lifting of restrictions. The effective-time-to-reopening interval was 4 hours 21 minutes. **[18–20, 29, 35]**

The FAA halted departures while controllers and crews managed airborne aircraft. Duffy reported roughly 3,500 aircraft airborne at the time and said crews and controllers handled them safely. Intermittent difficulties crossed facilities, while the agency continued managing flights already in the air. **[18–20]**

Airline operations recovered more slowly than FAA systems. Crews and aircraft were out of position and delays and cancellations carried into Saturday. Different news totals use different reporting windows and tracking data, so the figures cannot be compared directly. Saturday's AP account reported FAA expected travel to normalize by Sunday. **[29, 31]**

Ask FAA for a minute-by-minute public incident timeline covering first alarm, escalation, air traffic restrictions, equipment isolation, restoration tests and criteria for ending the ground stop.

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

What Duffy says the router did

Duffy's Friday account emphasized overloaded older telecom equipment and intermittent radar and voice instability. On Saturday he described a contractor converting lines to fiber at at least one remote site. He said a router involved in the transition began flooding other routers with repeated connection attempts. The measured symptom he cited was more than 1,000 attempts every four to five seconds. That is a connection count. It does not establish the volume or source of application payload data. **[18, 19]**

Duffy said officials were evaluating contractor user error, installation error and a faulty router. Reuters reported officials were looking at possible router problems in Arkansas and Texas and said instability affected 17 of 22 en route centers. Bedford described a replacement program involving Cisco equipment and Juniper routers. DOT's transcript uses the designation "Cisco 600," which requires technical clarification. The specific failed device, its model and firmware, and the traffic classification remain unverified. Equipment age must be assigned to the correct device. **[18, 29]**

L3Harris said it was supporting the investigation. It also reported that it, its telecom partners and FAA had completed over 70% of planned copper-to-fiber communications conversion. The statement did not make a root-cause finding. **[30]**

The public explanation would be stronger with a timestamped chronology, a high-level account of propagation and a summary of the evidence used to distinguish hardware failure from installation or operating error.

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

L3Harris and the network modernization

Legacy FTI. Harris won the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure contract in 2002. L3Harris is its successor. The carrier and contractor arrangements behind that network require attention alongside the individual router change. **[1, 5]**

Successor FENS. Verizon received the 2023 award. In August 2026 FAA gave AT&T a $74.3 million startup task order. FAA confirmed that AT&T would lead the program and Verizon would continue core network functions. The startup authorization covers planning and engineering while longer-term terms are completed. **[44, 45]**

Broader modernization. Peraton became prime integrator in December 2025. GAO cites a $1.5 billion ceiling for that separate award and identifies missing lifecycle cost and integrated-schedule work. ASI supplies FMDS and SMART through its own software contract. **[8–11]**

Friday's work. Bedford described routine maintenance of the legacy network, outside the Peraton-led $12.5 billion modernization effort. Duffy said the copper service faced discontinuation. Those statements identify an immediate reason for replacement and clarify the program responsible for the work. **[18]**

The overlap between software deployment and telecom transition remains an integration question. Obtain the dependency assessment and cross-program approvals to establish which network milestones FAA required before SMART expansion. L3Harris's reported conversion milestones do not establish what each SMART interface depended on. **[30, 36]**

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

SMART availability, live use and hosting

FAA announced that SMART was expanding across the airspace of all 22 centers. That announcement does not establish the time at which each local facility took up recommendations, what SMART processes were active Friday at 3:36 p.m., or whether any interface was isolated during recovery. Duffy described SMART as disconnected and “not even plugged in,” while explaining human review of its recommendations. Those remarks need an architectural explanation and do not establish that every SMART service was offline. **[17–19, 32]**

FAA identifies SMART as cloud-based and describes an operating chain. A specialist team in Washington reviews data, provides scheduling recommendations to the Command Center in Warrenton, Virginia, and the Command Center routes recommendations to local leadership for consideration. This describes responsibilities and the movement of recommendations at a high level. It leaves the production tenancy and network path unspecified. **[9, 12, 17]**

An April 6 AWS article coauthored by ASI executive Bernard Asare says ASI’s infrastructure uses AWS, including EKS, EC2, S3, RDS and Bedrock. It describes GovCloud use for defense customers. This establishes a company-level AWS architecture. The article does not identify the specific production environment or authorization boundary for FAA SMART. **[43]**

A cloud service can generate outputs while no facility is acting on them. A local facility can remain eligible to use SMART while temporarily relying on its usual workflow. FAA should state whether it meant SMART was offline, whether it meant the failed systems were outside SMART’s dependencies, or whether it verified both conditions. A service-status attestation and a sanitized dependency summary could answer this without disclosing sensitive network details.

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

The laptop analogy and the overload hypothesis

An old laptop can run out of memory or processor capacity when it runs demanding software. The analogy helps explain why the amount of work assigned to a device matters. In a cloud deployment, the heaviest calculations may run remotely while a client displays recommendations. A router has a different job. It can become overloaded by repeated connection activity even when the application payload is small. **[18, 29]**

Telecom change triggered the incident. The reported maintenance window and abnormal connection attempts fit this account. Confirm it against monitoring summaries and recovery actions. **[18]**

SMART used a shared path. The public record does not establish whether either application inputs or recommendations crossed the affected equipment. A documented shared dependency would establish a path to investigate. It would not establish a material increase in load.

SMART traffic materially contributed. This requires evidence connecting activity in SMART or an interface to a change in device load before the first alarms. Public records reviewed here do not supply that evidence. The count publicized by Duffy offers no insight into model compute, packet payloads or whether SMART generated the attempts. **[18, 19, 32]**

Was the old hardware capable of supporting the application? The hardware's function comes first. FAA describes cloud SMART. No source reviewed shows that a legacy device hosted its models. Bedford named Cisco and Juniper in describing the replacement program, while the exact failed-device model remains unconfirmed. **[18]** A public summary of baseline versus incident traffic, along with a high-level interface-dependency statement, can narrow the question.

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

What kind of AI ASI builds

ASI describes its Flyways platform as using airspace simulation and prediction to identify where demand will exceed capacity. Alaska Airlines described its earlier commercial use as machine learning that assists dispatchers. FAA says SMART brings together about 200 data streams, including flight paths, weather, traffic flow and staffing information. It uses these streams to anticipate problems and provide scheduling recommendations for human review. **[4, 12, 17, 37]**

A predictive planner can combine forecasts, simulation and constrained optimization. A forecast estimates conditions. Simulation evaluates how those conditions may evolve. An optimizer compares feasible choices under operational constraints. These are functional descriptions. They do not identify SMART's algorithms or establish that a large language model drives recommendations.

The commercial software has been described as proprietary. The AWS/ASI article describes custom model training, refinement and inference through Amazon Bedrock. It does not name model families or establish which components are deployed in SMART. A claim that a particular frontier, open-weight or language model drives FAA recommendations would require a deployment-specific inventory. **[37, 43]**

FAA reported approximately 180 rerouted flights and average savings of around 10 minutes and nearly 80 gallons per flight. To evaluate those figures, request the comparison baseline, sample definition, rejection rate, confidence intervals and performance under unusual weather or missing data. Request a high-level model and dependency inventory, version dates, change controls, and independent test outcomes. **[17]**

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

Air Space Intelligence and the FAA award

ASI identifies Phillip Buckendorf, Kris Dorosz and Lucas Kukielka as founders. Buckendorf is CEO. Its airline work and venture financing predate the current administration. FAA's FMDS market research also predates this award. **[2–4, 38]**

FAA selected ASI for FMDS, with SMART as an enhancement. The official award record reports a $875.95 million potential value, $23,340,500 obligated and performance dates of June 23, 2026 through June 21, 2038. Obligations represent commitments of federal funds. They do not establish payments to date or SMART's individual cost. **[9, 10]**

The same primary record lists 12 offers received and a competition classification of full and open competition after exclusion of sources. It identifies the solicitation procedure as alternative sources. The public fields leave bidder identities, exclusions, evaluation scores and the final selection rationale unresolved. **[10]**

Craft's October investment essay says ASI won against Palantir and Thales. That is an investor's account. The selection memorandum and award notices should establish the competitors and the agency's comparative findings. The June announcement names Duffy and Bedford as announcing officials. It does not identify every evaluator or decision-maker. **[9, 22]**

ASI's April 2025 congressional letter and its established airline deployments document its policy advocacy and operating credentials. Its first FAA sales presentation, technical demonstration and acquisition meetings remain to be dated. Seek the calendars, demonstration criteria, source-selection memorandum and milestone payment schedule. **[4, 6]**

Asare's biography in the AWS article lists earlier leadership roles at Lockheed and L3Harris. This documents a professional connection. His responsibilities in any FAA bid, contractor relationship or 2026 maintenance work would require separate evidence. **[43]**

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

Investors and administration roles

2020 and 2023. Renegade's 2023 account says it led the 2020 Series A and that co-founder Renata Quintini joined the board. Her current board status was not independently established. Andreessen Horowitz led the $34 million 2023 Series B. Renegade identifies a16z's David Ulevitch as the lead investor for that round. Bloomberg Beta, Spark and Renegade participated. **[3]**

October 2026. Spark led ASI's $325 million Series C at an announced $3 billion valuation. ASI named affiliates of Citadel Securities, Meritech Capital, Craft Ventures, Energy Impact Partners and a16z. Craft's announced investment followed the June award. The amounts and rights held by individual firms or partners were not disclosed in the financing announcement. **[21, 22]**

The documented links. David Sacks founded Craft Ventures. The White House identifies him as former special advisor for AI and crypto and as PCAST co-chair. The White House also lists a16z co-founder Marc Andreessen on PCAST, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. Craft's investment article is by Michael Robinson and Kindle Van Linge. That attribution does not establish how Sacks participated or whether he held an economic interest in this deal. The sources do not establish equivalent roles for the other ASI investors, a decision role for Andreessen or Sacks in the FAA procurement, or involvement by Ben Horowitz. **[21–23]**

Potential public equity. Politico and Semafor reported preliminary FAA equity discussions in October, raising questions about authority and the government's dual role as customer and potential investor. The reviewed record does not establish that a deal closed. Seek the proposed terms, legal review and current status. **[24]**

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

BGR, Duffy and the Alfonso campaign

Duffy's federal nominee disclosure lists BGR advisory-board service from November 2019 through November 2024. His January 2025 ethics agreement describes a one-year restriction after resignation on certain former-employer matters, with a prior-authorization provision. On the disclosed dates, that specific one-year period ended before the June 2026 ASI award. Other ethics obligations require their own facts and analysis. **[28]**


BGR's October 20 third-quarter filing reports $30,000 for ASI and describes advocacy concerning AI defense software. Its listed contacted institutions are the House, Senate and Department of Defense. The filing does not list DOT or FAA. It documents a lobbying relationship, without establishing BGR's participation in ASI's FAA selection. **[27]**

Alfonso for Congress reported receiving $2,500 from ASI PAC on March 31, 2026. The receipt appears on page 100 of the campaign's April 15 FEC filing, transaction SA11C.4281. Michael Alfonso is Duffy's son-in-law. The verified donor is the PAC. Personal donations by multiple ASI founders or a separate BGR PAC contribution to Alfonso were not established in this review. **[25, 26]**

ProPublica reported transportation-sector fundraising for Alfonso before the outage. The records justify questions about access, disclosure and the timing of contacts. They establish no exchange of a contribution for an official action. Ask DOT's ethics office, ASI and BGR for the applicable screening records and engagement chronology, including any record that corrects this account. **[26–28]**

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

ASI, its investors and federal leaders




PCAST is President Trump's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. Other disclosed Series C backers include Spark (lead), Citadel Securities affiliates, Meritech and Energy Impact Partners. **[21, 23]**

Craft's announced investment followed the FAA award. These links document official promotion, investment and advisory roles. They establish no procurement intervention by an investor or role in the outage.

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

Campaign and lobbying connections

The campaign receipt and lobbying filing document specific financial relationships. The historical BGR role has a separate time period.



The BGR filing lists defense-software advocacy and names the House, Senate and Department of Defense. It does not list DOT or FAA. **[27]**

Duffy's disclosed BGR departure in November 2024 places the specific one-year former-employer restriction before the June 2026 ASI award. Other ethics obligations require their own analysis. The diagram makes no allegation of improper influence or outage causation. **[28]**

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

What Congress asked for and why

Don Beyer called for a suspension at the September launch. Van Hollen and House colleagues then addressed their pause request to Duffy and Bedford. The public lead group included April McClain Delaney, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Beyer, Kweisi Mfume, Suhas Subramanyam and Sarah Elfreth. Reuters also identified signatures from Jamie Raskin and Raja Krishnamoorthi. Use the underlying letter for exact signature attribution. **[13, 15]**

The letter questioned the formal in-service decision, safety-risk documentation, model validation, high-impact AI classification, training, consultation, overrides and who would bear responsibility after a safety event. It asked for a pause pending answers and a response by October 19. Its reference to 90 days described the evaluation lawmakers understood FAA was undertaking. **[15]**

Larsen and Carson led 21 fellow House Transportation and Infrastructure Democrats in asking GAO to assess the safety-risk analysis, testing and certification, performance metrics and deployment strategy for both platforms. The two congressional actions asked different institutions to act. The first sought answers from DOT and FAA. The second asked GAO for independent review. **[16]**

FAA attributed expansion to a successful initial rollout. A public answer explaining the relationship between 50 elapsed days and the 90-day evaluation was not found. Request any dated agency reply and the decision record showing whether the original evaluation was formally shortened, continued in parallel or governed a narrower scope. **[15–17]**

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

What officials said after the outage

Duffy, Bedford and Mullin. The November 13 DOT briefing described the communications problem and the reopening. Duffy excluded SMART as the cause. Mullin had earlier allowed investigators to examine a potential link and later said they had found no evidence of a cyberattack. On Saturday Duffy and Bedford described the L3Harris telecom work and continued investigation. Duffy's pre-outage SMART promotion appears in the indexed FAA feed. **[17–19, 32, 39]**

Rick Larsen and Sam Graves. The ranking member and Republican committee chair issued a joint November 13 statement supporting the safety response and committing the committee to a thorough review. Larsen's own office said it was in contact with the FAA and airlines. Neither cited release attributed the outage to SMART or ASI. **[33]**

Maria Cantwell and Tammy Duckworth. Cantwell said her office was in touch with FAA and emphasized review of communications technology. Duckworth's reported X remarks stressed redundancy and seeking answers. The retrieved remarks did not identify SMART or ASI as the cause. **[34]**

Other pause and audit participants. Searches covered indexed public posts and office records around November 13–14 for McClain Delaney, Beyer, Van Hollen, Ocasio-Cortez and Carson, with additional checks of indexed coalition coverage. The strongest located primary SMART statements for those offices were the pre-outage letters and releases. This was a public, index-based review, with no complete capture of replies, deleted posts, unindexed feeds or every signatory's accounts. **[13, 15, 16]**

ASI. Multiple outlets reproduced the company's Friday social statement denying a causal link to SMART, its other products or its FAA integration. The company's denial is its public position. It does not supply production logs or fill the operational-status gap. **[32]**

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

What the press and independent reporters found

Reuters and AP. Reuters moved from the immediate disruption and reopening to the specific L3Harris router account, including unresolved installation and hardware possibilities. AP documented Duffy's separation of the outage from the AI tool and followed the delays into Saturday. **[29, 31]**

The Verge, Business Insider and GeekWire. The Verge and Business Insider covered the newly expanded tool and ASI's denial. GeekWire's Todd Bishop tracked the early questions about SMART and a contemporaneous Microsoft outage, then updated his article with officials' statements excluding both from the cause. The stories establish that SMART was publicly discussed during the response. They supply no independent evidence that it caused the incident. **[32, 39]**

Los Angeles Times and Hearst Television. The Los Angeles Times covered congressional concerns and ASI's denial. Hearst's investigative coverage examined the online questions about the timing of the new AI system. The underlying congressional letter is the authority for distinguishing its pause request from the 90-day evaluation. **[15, 40]**

Investigative reporting and podcasts. ProPublica's Megan O'Matz documented transportation-sector fundraising for Alfonso before the outage. Politico and Semafor independently covered the reported FAA equity discussions. Citizen Analyst published a self-described preliminary, AI-assisted backgrounder assembling procurement and campaign material. Its claims need verification against the underlying records. MS NOW's Deadline White House covered the ground stop in its November 13 episodes. No verified episode reviewed independently established the full investment, lobbying, campaign-finance and outage chain. A complete podcast transcript and social-account census was not obtained, so this review makes no claim of exclusivity. **[24, 26, 41, 42]**

The next reporting advance would be independent records showing a technical dependency or a specific contact tied to an award or rollout decision.

INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE

Who should answer next

FAA incident team and L3Harris · First priority. Who authorized the switchover? What was the first confirmed abnormal behavior? Which equipment was being replaced, and what caused the repeated attempts? Which testing and containment steps worked? Ask for preservation of the time-stamped records and a public incident summary with a date for final findings.

FAA Air Traffic Organization and ASI · Alongside the incident inquiry. Was SMART producing or delivering recommendations at the onset? Did any part use the affected service? Request a high-level statement of operating status and dependencies, with an independent reviewer able to test the statement against underlying records.

FAA Administrator and operational leads · Before the next oversight update. Who authorized nationwide use? What evidence closed each safety gate? What was the exact evaluation window? When did facilities, unions and airlines learn of the local and national phases? Ask for redacted signed decisions, summaries of testing and notice records.

FAA contracting officer, DOT ethics office, ASI, BGR and investors · Before making any procurement or ethics finding. Identify the decision authority and competitive process. Seek calendars, acquisition milestones, any disclosure and recusal determinations, and a response on potential public equity. Ask investors which roles their principals played in the financing or contracting and invite record-backed corrections.

Congress and GAO · At the next public briefing. Did DOT respond by October 19? Has GAO accepted or scoped the audit? Ask for public versions of the agency replies, audit status and any hearing plans.

Record dates, exact questions, responses, refusals and unresolved items. The release of corroborating records, conflicting evidence or verified corrections should drive the next edition.

SOURCE REGISTER

Source register

Select a source to open the underlying record or coverage.

1 DOT Inspector General • FTI contract and historical outage

2 FAA • 2020 FMDS market survey

2 FAA • 2024 FMDS market-research notice

3 Renegade Partners • ASI Series A and B financing

4 Alaska Airlines • Flyways partnership and operating trial

5 FAA • National Airspace System Safety Review and FENS

6 ASI • Bernard Asare letter to House Transportation and Infrastructure

7 Public Law 119-21 • Section 40003 aviation modernization

8 FAA • Peraton prime integrator selection

9 FAA • ASI selection for FMDS and SMART

10 USAspending • Award 693KA726C00064

11 GAO • Modernization cost and schedule report GAO-26-107992

12 FAA • September 21 SMART launch

12 DOT • September SMART fact sheet

13 Rep. Don Beyer • September 21 suspension request

14 GovInfo • Modern Skies Act S.5572

14 GovInfo • House Modern Skies Act H.R.10683

15 Sen. Van Hollen • October 9 pause letter and full text

15 Rep. Ocasio-Cortez • October 13 release on pause request

15 Reuters • Pause letter and additional signers

16 House T&I Democrats • October 13 request to GAO

17 FAA • November 10 expansion and November 13 statements

18 DOT • November 14 restoration briefing

19 DOT • November 13 briefing and lifting of ground stop

20 FAA • November 13 initial ground-stop statement

21 ASI • October 20 Series C announcement

22 Craft Ventures • ASI investment rationale

23 White House • PCAST members and leadership

23 Craft Ventures • David Sacks biography

SOURCE REGISTER

Source register continued

Select a source to open the underlying record or coverage.

24 Politico via Yahoo • Reported FAA equity discussions

24 Semafor • Reported talks and legal-authority questions

25 FEC • ASI PAC overview

25 FEC • Alfonso April 15 filing, p. 100, ASI PAC receipt

26 ProPublica via PBS Wisconsin • Alfonso campaign fundraising

27 U.S. lobbying disclosure • BGR Q3 report for ASI

28 OGE • Duffy nominee disclosure, BGR role dates, p. 3

28 OGE • Duffy January 13, 2025 ethics agreement, section 2

29 Reuters • Saturday L3Harris router reporting

29 Reuters • Friday reopening account

30 L3Harris • November 14 statement

31 AP • Saturday recovery and cancellations

31 AP • Friday ground stop and AI comments

32 Business Insider • ASI and Microsoft responses

32 The Verge • Ground stop and ASI denial

33 House T&I • Graves–Larsen joint statement

33 Rep. Rick Larsen • November 13 statement

34 Roll Call • Congressional reactions

34 KULR • Cantwell statement and post

34 Just the News • Duckworth statement, November 13

35 FAA • Advisory 111, November 13, effective 20:54 UTC

36 L3Harris • May conversion milestone

37 ASI • Air traffic management and simulation description

37 Aerospace America • Flyways and proprietary commercial software

38 ASI • Company and leadership

38 a16z • ASI founders and Flyways background

39 GeekWire • Todd Bishop on the initial FAA outage questions

39 FAA homepage • Indexed social feed and SMART promotion

40 Los Angeles Times • Congressional reaction and rollout context

40 Hearst/KMBC • SMART questions after the ground stop

41 Citizen Analyst • Preliminary AI-assisted backgrounder

42 MS NOW • Deadline White House, November 13 episodes

43 AWS / ASI • Company cloud and model architecture, April 6

44 USAspending • AT&T FENS startup award, August 12

45 Nextgov/FCW • AT&T lead role and FAA response, August 14