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The FAA Outage and the SMART Rollout

What the public record establishes about the technology, the money and the people

Zeffer Research | Clifford Hawk | November 13, 2026

Evidence cutoff: November 13 evening Pacific time. This report incorporates the evening federal briefing and supersedes the earlier infographic on the question of outage causation. It is a public-record investigation and analysis, not a completed engineering or ethics finding.

The central finding

The nationwide flight disruption deserves a documented, independent accounting. But the evidence does not support blaming SMART. By the evening of November 13, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy had expressly ruled out the new air-traffic planning tool as the cause. Air Space Intelligence, its developer, also denied that its products or FAA integration caused the ground stop. Officials instead described overloaded legacy telecommunications equipment. Their explanation was preliminary; a public forensic report was not available in the material reviewed. [1,39,40]

That distinction does not dispose of the separate oversight questions. The FAA selected a relatively young software company for a major, long-duration contract; introduced its planning system in September; and announced nationwide expansion in November. Lawmakers had already asked for a pause and an independent review of testing, workforce preparation and deployment criteria. Those questions existed before the outage and remain legitimate even if SMART played no part in it. [6,8,9,14,16]

The people and the money

The central public officials are Duffy and FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford. The vendor is Air Space Intelligence, led by Phillip Buckendorf. Its investors include Spark Capital, Andreessen Horowitz and Craft Ventures. Craft founder David Sacks and a16z co-founder Marc Andreessen also have documented presidential advisory roles. Separately, an ASI political action committee contributed to the congressional campaign of Duffy's son-in-law, Michael Alfonso. These are distinct relationships, each with a different date and evidentiary meaning. None by itself proves a corrupt award or a technical failure. [18,22,24,25,29,30]

Our conclusion is a demand for records: publish the outage analysis, explain the rollout gates, disclose the procurement decision and clarify relevant financial interests and recusals. A finding that SMART was uninvolved would be consequential evidence and should be stated plainly. The test is whether the government can substantiate its decisions, not whether a network diagram looks suspicious.

Inside: outage and architecture, pages 2–3; chronology and Congress, 4–5; company and relationships, 6–8; Nvidia context, 9; investigation agenda, 10; linked source notes, 11–12.

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What happened on November 13

The official ground-stop advisory ordered departing aircraft held and international arrivals handled individually. FAA Advisory 111 carries a 20:54 UTC signature, equivalent to 3:54 p.m. Eastern on November 13. Earlier news accounts used different times; this report uses the primary advisory for the formal order and distinguishes it from the reported onset of instability. [1]

Eastern time	Development and evidence
3:36 p.m.	Radar and communications instability began, according to Duffy's evening account. [4]
3:54 p.m.	FAA signed Advisory 111 ordering a national ground stop. [1]
Afternoon	Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said investigators were examining possible explanations, including a potential SMART connection. [3]
8:15 p.m.	Airspace reopened, according to Duffy; airline recovery was gradual. [4]
Evening briefing	Duffy excluded SMART and described overloaded older switches and routers. Mullin said no cyberattack evidence had been found. [3,39]

At the evening briefing, Duffy said the older equipment had produced inconsistent data; newer IP switches had remained operational. Mullin said installation of new equipment and patches appeared to have overwhelmed older systems, without identifying the particular equipment. The distinction is important: an interface or configuration problem during modernization is a more specific investigative lead than the broad assertion that "AI failed." [3]

What the explanation does and does not establish

The remarks identify an apparent failure mode, not the complete initiating chain. They do not publicly identify the responsible change ticket, the device or software version, the data source, the contractor responsible for the change, or the approvals and rollback sequence. Nor do the remarks establish whether a single local fault propagated through shared infrastructure. Those are the questions an incident report should resolve.

Officials reported no evidence of an attack, while Mullin stopped short of absolute certainty. The distinction between "no evidence found" and a final exclusion should survive into any later account. Conversely, early speculation about SMART should not be recycled as though the evening denial never occurred. ASI's denial is relevant evidence and must accompany discussion of the hypothesis. [39,40]

The disruption was national in consequence. NPR's evening account, citing FlightAware, reported more than 10,000 delays and 5,000 cancellations. Those are a contemporaneous snapshot, not a final audited count. A ground stop is a protective restriction on departures; it is not evidence that every airborne aircraft lost control or that every facility lost all radar and radio functions. [5]

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What SMART actually does

SMART stands for Strategic Management of Airspace, Routes and Trajectories. The FAA describes it as a cloud-based planning layer that forecasts traffic and constraints, helping people choose routes and departure times. It supplements existing systems; controllers retain responsibility for aircraft separation. Its purpose is to anticipate congestion rather than react after queues form. [7]

System or role	Function and boundary
SMART	Predictive planning and scheduling recommendations. It is not an autonomous pilot or a replacement for controllers. [6,7]
FMDS	Flow Management Data and Services: the traffic-management data platform. FAA described SMART as an enhancement within it. [8]
Telecommunications	Infrastructure that carries operational information. The Nov. 13 explanation concerned legacy switches and routers, rather than a proven SMART failure. [39]
Human review	FAA specialists examine recommendations; the Command Center forwards them; local facility leadership considers whether to use them. [2]

The June award joined two related software efforts, FMDS and SMART. FMDS is intended to modernize the information used by the Air Traffic Control System Command Center; SMART applies predictive planning to that information. It is therefore misleading to treat the full reported contract amount as a purchase of one standalone AI model. [8,9]

A credible benefit still needs a safety case

At launch on September 21, Duffy and Bedford argued that better forecasts could reduce congestion, fuel use and controller workload. Airline leaders including United's Scott Kirby, Delta's Ed Bastian, American's Robert Isom and Southwest's Bob Jordan publicly welcomed the potential. Their support matters, but endorsements do not substitute for evidence about rare events, degraded data, operator workload or integration failure. [6]

The November expansion announcement cited 180 rerouted flights, average savings of ten minutes and almost 80 gallons of fuel per flight. Those are agency-reported operational benefits. They do not tell readers how many recommendations were rejected, whether benefits were measured against a comparable control, or how the system performed in abnormal conditions. Those omissions in a brief announcement do not prove the underlying tests were absent. [2]

Human approval also needs examination. A reviewer must have enough time, training and independent information to challenge an automated recommendation. An investigation should ask how rejected recommendations are logged, whether a facility can stop using the tool without disrupting its other work, and whether the system behaves predictably when weather, staffing or flight-position information is stale. These are proposed tests of the safety case, not findings that SMART failed them.

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The chronology that matters

Dates distinguish prior advocacy from subsequent investment. They also separate a technical deployment from a funding proposal. A sequence can identify questions; it cannot, on its own, establish motive or causation.

Date	Documented event
2018–2021	ASI's founders build the company; Renegade leads a 2020 Series A. Alaska Airlines announces a Flyways agreement in May 2021. [18,19,21]
Dec. 2023	ASI announces $34 million Series B led by a16z. [20]
Apr. 28, 2025	ASI's Bernard Asare writes House T&I leaders supporting modernization funding. [26]
July 4, 2025	Public Law 119-21 provides broad aviation modernization funding, commonly rounded to $12.5 billion. [11]
Mar. 31, 2026	Alfonso campaign records $2,500 from ASI PAC. [29]
June 22	Duffy and Bedford announce ASI's FMDS/SMART award. [8,9]
Sept. 14	GAO flags planning weaknesses in the broader modernization initiative. [10]
Sept. 21	Limited Washington-area SMART use begins; Don Beyer calls for suspension pending safeguards. [6,15]
Sept. 28 / Oct. 1	Eric Schmitt and Tracey Mann introduce Senate and House Modern Skies bills. [12,13]
Oct. 9 / Oct. 13	McClain Delaney coalition seeks pause; Larsen and Carson seek GAO review. [14,16]
Oct. 15–21	Press reports tentative FAA equity discussions. ASI announces Series C; Craft describes its investment. BGR files Q3 lobbying report. [22,23,27,31,32]
Nov. 10	FAA announces national SMART expansion, 50 days after the regional launch. [2]
Nov. 11–12	Nvidia leadership transition and export-control oversight intensify. [33–37]
Nov. 13	National ground stop; evening officials identify legacy telecom overload and exclude SMART. [1,3,39]

The 50-day interval is calculated from September 21 to November 10. Lawmakers had described an expected 90-day evaluation. Whether the FAA changed a formal plan, completed separate gates early, or meant a different operational scope requires the underlying deployment documents. [14]

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Who advanced the project and who challenged it

SMART's rollout was an executive procurement and implementation decision. This review did not identify a standalone SMART law that Congress passed. Duffy and Bedford were the named executive champions; Buckendorf and Airlines for America chief Chris Sununu publicly supported the award. Public praise for President Trump does not establish that he personally evaluated bids or selected the vendor. [8]

The funding distinctions

The 2025 law's aviation provision, section 40 003, allocated approximately $12.52 billion across modernization categories. It did not name ASI or SMART. The announced ASI contract was roughly $875 million over twelve years for FMDS and SMART combined; that is an announced contract value, not proof that the entire amount had been spent. [9,11]

Senator Eric Schmitt introduced S.5572 on September 28, and Representative Tracey Mann introduced H.R.10683 on October 1. The Modern Skies proposal includes $600 million for strategic air-traffic-flow technology; its major appropriations total approximately $30.1 billion. The retrieved official records show introduced legislation, not enacted additional funding. Sponsoring that broader bill is not evidence of directing ASI's earlier award. [12,13]

People	Specific documented action
Don Beyer, D–Virginia	Called on Sept. 21 for suspension until controller input and independent testing addressed safety. [15]
April McClain Delaney, D–Maryland; Chris Van Hollen, D–Maryland	Led/joined Oct. 9 pause request with Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Don Beyer, Kweisi Mfume, Suhas Subramanyam and Sarah Elfreth. [14]
Rick Larsen, D–Washington; André Carson, D–Indiana	With 21 House T&I colleagues, asked GAO on Oct. 13 to audit SMART and FMDS. [16]
Maria Cantwell, D–Washington; Tammy Duckworth, D–Illinois	June hearing: Cantwell stressed broader safety needs; Duckworth expressed interest in predictive tools and airline involvement. These exchanges were not requests to halt SMART. [17]

The pause letter asked about safety evaluations, training and accountability; its authors described a 90-day evaluation before national expansion. The later GAO request sought independent examination, not a declaration of fault. This report did not locate a public response resolving those requests. Absence from this review should not be confused with proof that the FAA never answered. [14,16]

GAO's separate September report found missing lifecycle cost and integrated scheduling work in the broader modernization program. Its warnings support disciplined oversight, but are not a SMART-specific finding or a diagnosis of this outage. [10]

The other GAO-request signers were Eleanor Holmes Norton, John Garamendi, Hank Johnson, Dina Titus, Jared Huffman, Frederica Wilson, Mark DeSaulnier, Salud Carbajal, Greg Stanton, Sharice Davids, Jesús García, Chris Pappas, Marilyn Strickland, Patrick Ryan, Val Hoyle, Hillary Scholten, Kristen McDonald Rivet, Laura Friedman, Maxwell Frost, April McClain Delaney and Nellie Pou. [42]

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The company and its financial backers

Air Space Intelligence is a Boston-based software company with roots that predate the current administration. Its listed founders are Phillip Buckendorf, Kris Dorosz and Lucas Kukielka. Buckendorf is CEO; Dorosz is chief research officer. Current leadership includes Bernard Asare in civil aviation, Mark Lepczyk in defense, Dan Rickert as chief operating officer and Jon Varsanik as chief technology officer. These are company-reported roles, not an independently reconstructed ownership register. [18]

Financing	Documented participants and qualification
2020 Series A	Renegade Partners says it led the round. Its co-founder Renata Quintini joined the board and was still serving in its Dec. 2023 account. Current complete board composition was not established. [19]
2023 Series B $34 million	Andreessen Horowitz led; Bloomberg Beta, Renegade and Spark participated. David Ulevitch led the round for a16z according to Renegade. [19,20]
2026 Series C $325 million	Spark led. ASI named affiliates of Citadel Securities, Meritech Capital, Craft Ventures, Energy Impact Partners and a16z. Announced private valuation: $3 billion. [22]

The two quantified rounds above total $359 million. That is a sum of the disclosed 2023 and 2026 financings, not a verified lifetime funding total. A private valuation is not cash in the bank, and the financing releases do not reveal each investor's ownership percentage, control rights or individual partners' economic exposure.

Commercial history is an important counterweight

Alaska Airlines announced a multiyear Flyways agreement in May 2021 after a six-month trial. Dispatchers retained the decision on whether to accept route recommendations. That history makes it inaccurate to portray ASI as a company created solely to obtain a Trump-era FAA contract. Equally, experience with an airline's routing decisions does not by itself establish readiness for integration across national public infrastructure. [21]


Craft's October 21 investment essay says it first met Buckendorf in 2025. Its publicly disclosed investment followed the June FAA award. The essay's account of customer enthusiasm and ASI's competitive success is investor advocacy; the procurement file is the better source for bid scoring and selection criteria. This review found no basis to label the award no-bid. [23]

For accountability, ask for the contracting officer's determination, evaluation criteria, competing proposals and scoring, award modifications, obligations to date and performance milestones. Ask ASI for the relevant corporate structure and board oversight of safety. Those records would clarify who had authority and financial exposure without imputing misconduct from a financing announcement.

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The documented relationship map

The diagram separates investment and advisory links from lobbying and campaign relationships. Every connection has a defined meaning; none is an allegation that a person caused the outage.



Sources for the map: company and financing disclosures [18–25]; BGR lobbying report [27]; Duffy ethics agreement [28]; FEC contribution record [29]; family relationship reporting [30]. The diagram is selective, not a complete board, cap-table or influence map.

Where the connections warrant scrutiny

Sacks and Andreessen have different roles from the contractor

Craft identifies David Sacks as its founder and partner. The White House currently identifies him as a former AI and crypto special adviser and a co-chair of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, alongside Michael Kratsios. The same council lists Marc Andreessen, a16z's co-founder, as a member. These facts establish overlapping commercial and advisory networks; they do not establish involvement in FAA contractor selection. [24,25,38]

The useful questions concern scope and timing: did either man discuss ASI, its procurement or deployment with officials; what financial interests applied then; and what disclosure, recusal or ethics review covered those interactions? This report has not verified personal ASI stakes for Sacks or Andreessen. A firm's investment should not be represented as a proven personal holding.

Duffy and BGR

BGR's Q3 2026 disclosure reported $30,000 in lobbying income from ASI. The listed issues concerned defense AI software and named the House, Senate and Defense Department as contacts, not DOT or FAA. That quarter followed the June award. The filing establishes a retained lobbying relationship, not that BGR obtained this FAA contract. [27]

Duffy's January 13, 2025 ethics agreement said he had resigned from BGR and described a one-year restriction after resignation on specified matters involving the firm, absent authorization. On that chronology, the particular resignation-based year would ordinarily have elapsed before June 2026. It would be inaccurate to present the agreement alone as evidence of a violation. Any further ethics question needs the applicable dates, interests, matter and advice. [28]

The Alfonso contribution

The Alfonso for Congress report filed April 15 records a $2,500 contribution received March 31 from Air Space Intelligence, Inc. PAC, committee C00 930 628. It predates the award. Michael Alfonso is Duffy's son-in-law. This warrants asking who solicited the contribution and whether any procurement discussions accompanied it; the record reviewed does not answer those questions. A PAC contribution is not a personal payment to Duffy or proof of a purchased decision. [29,30]

In an earlier, general response to ProPublica, Duffy's spokesperson said his fundraising participation was personal and regulatory decisions followed career safety professionals, law and facts. That response predates this ASI contribution and is not a specific response to it. [30]

Reported government equity discussions

POLITICO reported tentative FAA discussions about an ASI equity interest in October; Semafor described the idea as preliminary. No completed stake was verified. If pursued, ownership would raise a structural question: how would government protect independent safety and purchasing decisions while holding an economic interest in the vendor? This is a conditional governance concern, not a finding that the FAA owns ASI. [31,32]

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Why the Nvidia controversy changes the political context

The aviation disruption arrived during a separate technology-policy crisis. Nvidia's SEC filing says its board accepted Jensen Huang's resignation as CEO, president and director on November 11. It appointed finance chief Colette Kress interim CEO and Harvey Jones board chair; the public announcement followed November 12. The filing establishes the transition, not every allegation circulating about its cause. [33]

On November 12, Republican committee chairs Brian Mast, John Moolenaar and Rick Crawford sought appearances from Huang, Nvidia general counsel Tim Teter and Commerce Under Secretary Jeffrey Kessler. Senators Elizabeth Warren and Chris Coons had separately sought preservation of Nvidia-related records and a briefing on November 11. Those are documented oversight actions. Allegations recounted in congressional correspondence remain allegations unless independently established. [36,37]

Reuters, relaying Axios reporting on November 11, described a dispute over Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick's handling of restrictions on companies suspected of diverting Nvidia chips to China. The account described Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pressing Lutnick in a meeting that included Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth and Jamieson Greer. Commerce denied the reported confrontation. The sourcing and denial both matter. [34,35]

By November 13, the policy disagreement was public: Reuters reported Bessent saying Treasury, State, the Pentagon and the trade representative had favored blacklisting Megaspeed for months, while Commerce controlled that decision. This provides firmer evidence of an interagency divide than anonymous descriptions of a private meeting. [41]

The connection is governance and public confidence

The common concern is how a government distinguishes technical and national-security judgment from commercial access. In aviation, the relevant decisions involve procurement, integration, staffing and safety gates. In export policy, they concern enforcement and access to advanced chips. The records do not establish a shared transaction, coordinated scheme or technical link between the two controversies.

For Trump and his close advisers, the political exposure is nevertheless real as an analytical possibility. When an administration publicly takes credit for rapid technology deployment, it assumes responsibility for showing the basis for that speed. Advisory roles held by investment-firm leaders can intensify demands for disclosure even where the investments are lawful and the technology works. The defensible claim is that these overlaps increase the need for transparent process, not that they prove favoritism.

The strongest scrutiny would test explanations symmetrically. Publish evidence that clears SMART if the architecture and logs support it. Publish evidence of any unrelated change that overloaded the telecom network. Explain why the national rollout satisfied its gates. Document who spoke to whom during procurement and what safeguards applied. A report that omits exculpatory facts would weaken the investigation it seeks to advance.

The investigation that would resolve the questions

SMART may have had nothing to do with the outage; Duffy's current account expressly excludes it. Its national role, contract scale and pace of expansion still justify independent scrutiny. The investigation should keep engineering causation, procurement integrity and political accountability as separate questions until evidence connects them.

Record to obtain	What it would establish
Incident and change records	The initiating change, affected systems, load behavior, propagation, restoration and contractor responsibilities. Preserve configuration snapshots, logs and change approvals.
Architecture and isolation evidence	Whether SMART/FMDS and core telecom share relevant interfaces; what controls prevent failures from crossing boundaries. Release a security-appropriate public account.
Deployment safety case	The approved evaluation period, in-service decision, risk assessments, abnormal-condition tests and objective gates for each expansion.
Workforce evidence	Who was trained, when, with what exercises; controller and dispatcher feedback; ability to reject recommendations; logs of overrides and errors.
Procurement and ethics file	Competitive scoring, modifications and spending; relevant meetings and messages; beneficial interests, recusals and ethics determinations.
Independent oversight response	FAA answers to the October letters; status of the requested GAO work; DOT inspector-general assessment where within its remit.

Questions for the named decision makers

Duffy and Bedford should identify who approved the rollout gates and explain the 50-day expansion against lawmakers' 90-day understanding. Buckendorf and ASI's technical leadership should describe test results and relevant system boundaries. Craft and a16z should clarify who handled the investment and any government contacts. Sacks and Andreessen should clarify any relevant involvement and interests. Alfonso's campaign and ASI PAC should explain the contribution's solicitation and purpose. These are requests for information, not presumed adverse answers.

Larsen, Carson, McClain Delaney and Van Hollen can clarify whether their requests were answered and whether review is underway. Schmitt and Mann can explain how proposed funding would strengthen independent validation. Oversight should include both supporters of modernization and those who sought a pause; modernization and rigorous testing are compatible goals.

Reporting method and right of reply

This report combines government records, corporate disclosures and attributed reporting available by the cutoff. It includes published responses where located. No interviews were conducted for this report and no new right-of-reply responses were obtained. It does not claim access to classified information, private cap tables, procurement scoring or engineering logs. Those limits define the next reporting steps.

About Zeffer Research

Zeffer connects the dots across business, technology, finance and public policy. We examine how capital, incentives and decisions intersect, distinguish documented links from hypotheses, and update our conclusions when facts change. Explore our research at www.zeffer.ai.

Sources and verification notes

Bracketed numbers refer to these linked sources. Government and corporate records establish their own actions and statements; reporting and allegations are attributed in the text.

[1] FAA. National ground stop Advisory 111 Nov. 13, 2026.

[2] FAA. General statements and national SMART expansion Nov. 10 and 13, 2026.

[3] GeekWire / Todd Bishop. Officials blame aging FAA telecom gear Nov. 13, updated evening.

[4] Reuters. Flights resume after communications failure Nov. 13, 2026.

[5] NPR via Jefferson Public Radio. FAA lifts nationwide ground stop Nov. 13, evening update.

[6] FAA. SMART launch and limited regional deployment Sept. 21, 2026.

[7] FAA. SMART fact sheet 2026.

[8] DOT. Selection of ASI for FMDS and SMART June 22, 2026.

[9] ASI. FAA contract announcement June 22, 2026.

[10] GAO. Modernization cost and schedule planning, GAO-26-107 992 Sept. 14, 2026.

[11] GovInfo. Public Law 119-21, section 40 003 July 4, 2025.

[12] GovInfo. S.5572, Modern Skies Act, introduced text Sept. 28, 2026.

[13] GovInfo. H.R.10683, introduced bill record Oct. 1, 2026.

[14] Sen. Chris Van Hollen. Pause request and full congressional letter Oct. 9, 2026.

[15] Rep. Don Beyer. Statement seeking suspension pending safeguards Sept. 21, 2026.

[16] House T&I Democrats. Larsen and Carson request GAO audit Oct. 13, 2026.

[17] Senate Commerce / GovInfo. Close Calls aviation hearing, S. Hrg. 119-524 June 23, 2026.

[18] ASI. Company leadership biographies Accessed Nov. 13, 2026.

[19] Renegade Partners. Series A history and Series B investment Dec. 7, 2023.

[20] WilmerHale. ASI $34 million Series B financing Dec. 13, 2023.

Sources and verification notes continued

Bracketed numbers refer to these linked sources. Government and corporate records establish their own actions and statements; reporting and allegations are attributed in the text.

[21] Alaska Airlines. Flyways partnership and trial history May 25, 2021.

[22] ASI. Series C participants and valuation Oct. 20, 2026.

[23] Craft Ventures. Michael Robinson and Kindle Van Linge investment essay Oct. 21, 2026.

[24] Craft Ventures. David Sacks biography Accessed Nov. 13, 2026.

[25] White House OSTP. PCAST membership and leadership Accessed Nov. 13, 2026.

[26] ASI / House T&I. Bernard Asare modernization support letter Apr. 28, 2025.

[27] Lobbying Disclosure Act filing. BGR Q3 ASI report, $30,000 Filed Oct. 20, 2026.

[28] Office of Government Ethics. Sean Duffy ethics agreement Jan. 13, 2025.

[29] FEC. Alfonso Q1 report, page 100, SA11C.4281 Filed Apr. 15, 2026.

[30] ProPublica / Megan O'Matz via PBS Wisconsin. Duffy family and transportation fundraising Mar. 20, 2026.

[31] POLITICO via Yahoo. Reported FAA discussions of an ASI equity stake Oct. 15, 2026.

[32] Semafor. Preliminary equity talks and legal authority Oct. 16, 2026.

[33] SEC / Nvidia. Form 8-K, Item 5.02, CEO transition Filed Nov. 12, 2026.

[34] Reuters via Investing.com. Axios account of disputed export-control confrontation Nov. 11, 2026.

[35] Axios. Commerce denial of Bessent–Lutnick confrontation Nov. 11, 2026.

[36] House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mast, Moolenaar and Crawford requests Nov. 12, 2026.

[37] Senate Banking Democrats. Warren and Coons records preservation request Nov. 11, 2026.

[38] Andreessen Horowitz. Marc Andreessen biography Accessed Nov. 13, 2026.

[39] ABC News via ABC7 Chicago. Evening briefing and outage live updates Nov. 13, 2026.

[40] Business Insider. SMART vendor denial and official response Nov. 13, 2026.

[41] Reuters / Shepardson and Chiacu. Bessent publicly describes export-control disagreement Nov. 13, 2026.

[42] House T&I Democrats. Signed GAO study request, signatures pages 3–4 Oct. 13, 2026.

Verification limits: source pages may be updated after the cutoff. Procurement records, current beneficial ownership and complete safety testing were not obtained. No inference of illegality or outage causation is drawn solely from a donation, investment, former employer or advisory role.