
Try Firing Elon or Mark. Try Overruling Sergey.

Jensen’s exit exposes the accountability gap in founder-led tech.



NVIDIA / JENSEN HUANG

No founder super-votes

One share, one vote. Huang held 3.58% beneficial ownership. NVIDIA announced his resignation as CEO and director on Nov 12; the board accepted it Nov 11.

Ownership: Mar 23, 2026. A resignation, not a stated firing.

TESLA / ELON MUSK

Influence without dual class

One share, one vote. A staggered board and Musk’s brother on the board raise independence questions. Pay litigation exposed oversight concerns; the award was restored on appeal in Dec 2025.

Different control mechanism; Musk is not legally unremovable.

META / MARK ZUCKERBERG

13.4% stake → 60.6% votes

Class B: 10 votes per share; Class A: one. Zuckerberg can elect every director. He rejected proposed sunset clauses in 2026.

Economic interest and voting power: Oct 1, 2026.

ALPHABET / PAGE + BRIN


52.7% combined votes

Class B: 10 votes. Class A: one. Class C: none. Page and Brin together hold majority voting power. Sergey is a co-founder and director, not CEO.

Voting power: Apr 6, 2026. Brin alone is not a majority.

TECH’S VOTING-RIGHTS GAP

Companies with dual-class shares



Fenwick 2025. Defined samples; not every tech company.
Bars show share of each sample on a 0–100% scale.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP

Founder control can weaken independent pay negotiations and board oversight. Super-votes can separate financial ownership from the power to replace directors.

Governance analysis, not a finding of universal misconduct.

Public capital. Unequal votes. Who controls the board?

Equal voting rights • **Sunset clauses** • **Independent pay talks** • **Annual director elections**

SOURCES: NVIDIA release + 2026 proxy · Meta Nov 2026 statement · Alphabet/Tesla 2026 proxies
Delaware Supreme Court, Dec 2025 · Fenwick 2025 survey. Company panels and chart link to sources.